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THE INDEPENDENT DOCTRINE OF RATIFICATION
V.
THE RESTATEMENT AND MR. SEAVEY
Aaron D. Twerskit
If one were to ask any student of the law who has even a passing
familiarity with fundamental agency concepts to explain the basic
rationale underlying those concepts, one could expect for the most
part a lucid explanation. In the main, the rules of agency make good
common sense. They generally conform to the exigencies of the
business community with comparative ease and rarely conflict with
the contract and tort principles which provide the matrix for their
operation.' The doctrine of ratification is an exception. Simply stated,
it provides that a principal who subsequently consents to the un-
authorized act of his agent or one who purports to be his agent can
acquire rights and be subjected to liabilities with the same effect as
if the act were originally authorized.2
It is apparent from the mere exposition of the doctrine that its
rules of operation are not reconcilable with those of contract and tort
law.3 That one can bind himself to a contract retroactively, 4 without
t A.B., Beth Medrash Elyon; J.D., Marquette University; Teaching Fellow,
Harvard Law School, 1966-67; Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1. The doctrine of "inherent agency power" imposes liability on a principal for
acts of an agent even though there is no tort, contract, or restitutional theory to
account for such liability. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGcC § 8A (1957) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement acknowledges that liability under this
doctrine is purely a product of the agency relationship; i.e., the principal is held liable
for certain unauthorized acts of an agent as a cost of doing business through an agent.
1d. comments a, b. See also Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) (L. Hand, J.).
2. RESTATEMENT § 82; W. SEAvEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 32A (1964) [hereinafter
cited as SEAvEY].
3. SEAvEY § 32A.
4. RESTATEMENT §§.100, 10A.
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receiving consideration,5 and without communication to the other con-
tracting party 6 is clearly violative of fundamental contract principles.
Nor did traditional tort law recognize that a person could become
liable for compensatory 8 or even punitive damages ' after the com-
pletion of a tort, when the tortfeasor was not his agent at the time
the tort was committed.'" Given these incongruities, it is not at all
difficult to sympathize with those commentators who have attacked
ratification as being an anomaly in the law," absurd," or a foolish
fiction.'" Although they had before them a doctrine which worked
at cross-currents with well-established common law concepts, they could
not discover a coherent and comprehensive rationale to justify its
existence.
In truth, even the staunchest defenders of the ratification doctrine
can be described as mildly uncomfortable with its operation in certain in-
stances "4 and utterly at loss to explain its complexities in others.'" For
example, courts were early faced with the question whether a principal
could bind a third party who had dealt with a purported agent if the
third party learned of the agent's lack of authority and sought to
withdraw prior to ratification by the principal."6 Under the rules of
ratification the rights and liabilities of both parties to the contract
relate back to the time when the third party contracted with the pur-
ported agent.' 7  To be consistent, the withdrawal of the third party
should be ineffective, since "relation back" goes into effect as soon as
5. RESTATEMENT § 82, comment c.
6. RESTATEMENT § 95.
7. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 19 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRAcrS §§ 67, 109 (1963). A contract is deemed made at the time when the last act
necessary for its formation is done. RESTATEMENT OF CoNRAcrs § 74 (1932).
& Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891); F. MECHEM, OUT-
LINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 212-13 (4th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as MECHEM].
9. Gindin v. Baron, 11 N.J. Super. 215, 78 A.2d 297 (App. Div. 1951) ; Tauscher
v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936).
10. For the reasons offered for vicarious liability see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
9 68 (d ed. 1964). The reasons all place heavy emphasis on the ability of the master
to control and select the servant. This rationale obviously will not explain the ratifi-
cation of a tort since the master enters the scene after the tort has been committed.
11. ME.CHM § 145.
12. Holmes, Agency, 5 H~av. L Rzv. 1, 14 (1891).
13. J. EwnrT, WAwmE DismmuTm 129 n.1 (1917).
14. RESTATEMENT § 82, comment d. Mechem takes the position that ratification
of a purported agent's tort makes no sense at all and rests solely on the mechanical
application of the maxim, Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequipara-
tur (every ratification relates back and is equivalent to a prior authority). MECHEM
99212-14.
15. MEcHMa § 251.
16. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 139 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1943);
Bardusch v. Hofbeck, 139 N.J. Eq. 327, 51 A.2d 231 (Ch. 1947); Atlee v. Bartholo-
mew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N.W. 110 (1887); Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 630 (1861);
RESTATEMENT, Reporter's Notes to § 88 and cases cited therein.
17. RESTATEMENT §§ 100, 100A.
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the principal ratifies.'" To avoid this result the argument has been
made that it would be unfair to permit the principal to ratify when he
has paid no consideration to the third party to hold the offer open.19
The problem with this approach is that it relies on a principle of
contract law. Yet the doctrine of ratification itself is in violation of
contract principlesY0 The result is a doctrine of ratification that is
disjointed rather than unified.
One might hope that such eclecticism would not have been tolerated
for long and that an attempt would have been made to develop some
fundamental principles which would impose order in this seemingly
chaotic area of the law. Instead one finds apology in the place of
reason and tortured analogy substituted for painstaking analysis. We
are told that the "unique" 21 doctrine of ratification is a "beneficent"
one that "hurdles the technicalities of torts and contracts"; 22 that its
inconsistencies should be tolerated because it "has been found for
the most part to satisfy the needs of the commercial community"; 23
and that it is justified because "in most cases, it corrects minor errors
of agents without harm to anyone." 24 Lest our historical sensibilities
be offended we are assured that the "relation back" doctrine is not a
novel concept at all: a third party beneficiary contract in which A has
promised B to pay C relates back and becomes enforceable by C only
after he has elected to bind A.2 1 "Estoppel by deed" is brought forth
18. Seavey contends that to permit "relation back" to bind a third party wishing
to withdraw prior to ratification "is to worship the fiction of relation back as a
transcendental shrine . . ." He sharply criticizes the English cases for permitting a
principal to ratify under these conditions. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE
L.J. 859, 891 (1920). Wambaugh, A Problem as to Ratification, 9 HARv. L. REv. 60
(1895), correctly points out that logic only dictates that if ratification takes place, then
it relates back; but in the withdrawal cases we are faced with the question of whether
or not a principal may ratify. Nevertheless, we cannot hide from the fact that after
seventy years of comment by courts and scholars the only reasoning which supports
the American cases which refuse a principal the right to ratify if the third party has
withdrawn is the principle of contract law that an offer may be withdrawn at any time
prior to acceptance, except in the cases of promissory estoppel and option contracts.
For the author's suggested solution to the dilemma see text pp. 13-14 infra.
19. SEAvEY § 35.
20. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
21. 1 F. MECHEm, OTLINEs oF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 345 (2d ed. 1914).
22. Seavey, Ratification-Purporting to Act as Agent, 21 U. Ci. L. REv. 248,
250 (1954).
23. SEAVEY § 32A.
24. Id.
25. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 890 (1920). The view
that the rights of a third party beneficiary do not vest until the beneficiary knows of the
contract and assents to it has met with strong criticism. See Hughes v. Gibbs, 55
Wash. 2d 791, 350 P.2d 475 (1960); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 178 (1928). One author
states that those courts which have taken the position that the assent of the beneficiary
is a necessary element have been motivated by the unrealistic desire to make the
beneficiary privy to the contract. He forcefully argues that the interests of third
parties should be deemed mere expectancies unless the beneficiaries have changed their
positions before being notified of any attempted discharge. G. GIUsMoRE, PRINCIPLES
oF THE LAW OP CoNTRAC S §242 (J. Murray ed. 1965). If we were to draw the
analogy to ratification pursuant to the above reasoning, the third party could withdraw
after ratification unless the principal had somehow acted to his detriment. Permitting
19681
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as a close analogy: if a person purports to convey property which he
does not own but later acquires, the transferee's title dates from the
time of the attempted transfer because that was "the manifest intent
of the parties." 26
Perhaps Professor Seavey is correct in his assumption that the
longevity of the ratification doctrine is indicative of its expediency and
utility,2 7 but one can hardly be satisfied with ex post facto legal reason-
ing which stops at the fact that a legal concept works without inquiring
why it works. Furthermore, the failure to articulate clearly a sound
rationale for a legal doctrine and the willingness to live with rules that
are not clearly understood inevitably extend once-useful concepts by
analogy to areas of the law in which they do not properly belong. An
examination of the ratification doctrine has led this writer to conclude
that it merits independent recognition as a viable agency concept. The
failure to recognize its independent significance has unfortunately led to
its misapprehension and misapplication and has caused needless con-
fusion to generations of students who have sought to reconcile rati-
fication with traditional common law rules.
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE AND A SUGGESTED RATIONALE
On a hot summer day T wanders onto a construction site looking
for work, and is hired by A, who purports to be in charge of hiring
the third party to withdraw after ratification by the principal would destroy the utility
of the doctrine. It is not intended that this analogy be taken seriously since the policy
considerations which determine when the rights of a third party beneficiary vest and
when ratification becomes effective are so divergent that there is no good reason for the
results in the two cases to be similar. In the case of a third party beneficiary there
is no injustice in permitting the promisor and promisee to rescind the contract if the
third party has not acted to his detriment because of his expectancy. He was not a
party to the transaction which gave rise to the underlying obligation and can lay no
claim to a right which he did not bargain for. In the case of ratification the question
is, Does T, who bargained with one purporting to be the agent of P, receive the
benefits of a contract for which he bargained if P has ratified the agent's act? If the
analogy is intended merely to convey that the "relation back" concept was extant at
common law, one can hardly find fault with it, but if that is all it signifies, it is of
little aid in discerning the reasons underlying the ratification doctrine.
26. See SE vEY § 32A. The analogy to estoppel by deed was apparently considered
to have special merit because once the grantor receives title to the property it is auto-
matically transferred by operation of law to the grantee. Thus, the grantee becomes
the owner of the property and loses his right of action for breach of contract against
the grantor. Similarly, when a principal ratifies a contract, the contract relates back
to the time of the original agreement between the third party and the purported agent,
and the third party loses his cause of action against the agent for breach of warranty
of authority. It should be noted that this analogy holds only if we adopt the view that
the title acquired by the grantor passes to the grantee by operation of law. According
to another view, the grantee may maintain an action against the grantor for breach
of covenant or at his election rely upon the estoppel. 3 AMEMICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 15.23 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). Furthermore, the doctrine of estoppel by deed has its
roots in the old common law actions of restoration and warrant. 22 HAv. L. Rxv. 136
(1908). That the concept of "relation back" may be borrowed from an area of the
law so heavily laden with tradition is highly suspect.
27. See SFAvEy § 32A.
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for P, but is actually an ordinary workman out on a romp.' T is hired
to haul concrete blocks on the job for two days at the wage of $5.00
per hour. After completing his work T approaches P for payment. T
informs P that he was hired by A at $5.00 per hour and that he now
wishes to be paid. P replies, "Bring me a note from A stating that
you have worked the number of hours you claim and I will pay you."
T returns with the note. In the interim P has had second thoughts on
the matter since the going rate for construction workers is only $4.00
per hour. He informs T that A had no authority to hire workers and
refuses payment.
Let us assume that T is intent on exercising his full contractual
rights and will not be satisfied with a mere restitutionary action. Given
these circumstances, there is no question that P would not be bound on
the contract but for the doctrine of ratification. There never was an offer
made to P which he could accept. An offer is an expression of willing-
ness that a contract shall be made in the future (upon acceptance). T
only assented to a contract which he believed to be binding at the
moment he concluded his conversation with A. To say that T con-
templates that A may not have the power to contract and therefore is
bargaining in the alternative for a contract to be formed when the
alleged principal consents is sheer sophistry.' That was clearly not
T's intent. Furthermore, since T has completed performance before
his encounter with P, there is no present consideration passing from
T to P to support P's promise to pay.
Why then is the law so insistent that T, whose contractual rights
are nonexistent, be handed gratis a contract valid ab initio under the
doctrine of ratification? " Clearly T cannot plead estoppel since he did
not act to his detriment as a result of P's statement that he would be
paid. A acted without authority from P, and P was not responsible
for clothing A with indicia of apparent authority. Furthermore, A
did not act within the scope of any "inherent agency power" since A's
act was not incidental to a transaction he was authorized to undertake."1
To answer an agency problem that cuts across the disciplines of
both contract and tort and is therefore likely to cause confusion in
28. Connoisseurs of agency law will recognize a striking resemblance between
this case and that perennial casebook favorite, Evans v. Ruth, 129 Pa. Super. 192, 195
A. 163 (1937).
29. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 887 (1920).
30. The usual approach to the problem of ratification has been to ask why the
principal should be given the option to accept or reject a contract in a changing market.
See RESTATEMENT § 82, comment d; Seavey, supra note 29, at 888. Mechem points out
that the error in this approach is that it conjures up the image of a principal "who
wishes in cold blood to become bound on a contract made in his name but by a pur-
ported agent who lacked authority to bind the purported principal. . . ." In reality,
the vast majority of cases focus on a third party who seeks to hold the principal from
avoiding the consequences of his ratification. MECHEM § 197.
31. RESTATE2MENT § 161.
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both, it would seem particularly appropriate to examine whether there
are agency values that are being furthered by the ratification of a non-
existent or unauthorized agency. It might be helpful to imagine
ourselves in the place of T immediately after P ratified the transaction.
T was hired to work on a construction job by one who purported to
have the authority to hire and who subsequently appeared to have
been confirmed in that authority by P. Although A had usurped
without P's knowledge whatever authority he appeared to have at the
time of contracting by virtue of his dress and demeanor, it would
nonetheless offend our sense of justice if after the ratification T were
denied the benefits of a contract he believed to be in existence. As
noted earlier, classical estoppel will not explain our sense of outrage,
since T has already performed his side of the "contract" and has not
acted to his detriment subsequent to the ratification.
It is submitted that a value peculiar to agency is the crucial
determinant that has escaped examination in this set of circumstances.
For better or worse, it is a fact of life that the vast majority of business
transactions are conducted through agents properly operating within
the scope of their authority. The case in which an agent exceeds his
authority or a person purports to act as an agent without any authority
whatsoever is an aberration rather than the norm. Thus, a third party
who deals with a person who appears to be an agent acting within the
scope of his agency is justified by the usual state of affairs in doing so.
If we refuse to hold a principal liable when someone purports to act
as his agent or when a real agent acts outside the scope of his authority,
it is because we must balance equities to protect an innocent principal.
It is in this setting that we have made the judgment that a principal
will only be held if he has been responsible for giving an agent the
trappings of authority,"2 or if a general agent has acted not unlike
agents with similar authority." Now, however, we are faced with the
case of a principal who has confirmed an unauthorized act and who
therefore cannot wrap himself in the cloak of innocence. P has
confirmed T in his belief that a transaction which had all the markings
of a regular business deal was in fact authorized. The transaction
appears to be completed. T dealt with a person whom he believed to'be
an agent and whose credentials he did not investigate in the faith that
most agents operate within the bounds of their authority. When P
himself has acted as though the transaction were in order, T's faith in
its regularity is reinforced. No doubt crosses his mind that he has
in fact been a party to an enforceable contract. In this light, it is ody
32. Id. § &
33. Id. § 161.
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fair that a transaction which has been stamped with regularity from
its very inception and whose regularity has been confirmed come to a
complete close and be beyond the recall of all parties. It is this value-
the bringing to a close a business transaction whose appearance of
normalcy has been confirmed-which is promoted by the doctrine of
ratification.
In a sense the suggested thesis is one that has already met with
considerable approval in traditional agency thinking. The doctrine
of apparent authority is based on the theory that when a principal
appoints an agent he must live with the consequences arising from the
appearance of authority with which the agent is clothed. When T
deals with an agent who has apparent authority, P is bound whether
or not T has acted to his detriment. If he had so acted, there would
be no need for an independent theory of apparent authority since the
doctrine of estoppel would suffice.' Nonetheless, P is bound even if
there has been no detrimental reliance by T, and even if the act of the
agent may be disavowed without hurting any of the parties involved.'
It has been argued that the doctrine of apparent authority is nothing
more than an expression of the objective theory of contract-that one
should be bound by what he says rather than by what he intends.86 But
one cannot slide so easily over the fact that when an agent with ap-
parent authority acts outside the scope of his real. authority it is the
objective manifestation of the agency with which we are dealing and
not the objective manifestation of the principal's contractual will. 7
Thus, if we bind a principal to the unauthorized acts of his agent
under the doctrine of apparent authority, it is because we put a premium
on finding an agency wherever there is the appearance of one. The
business world insists that it be able to rely on the state of affairs as
they appear to the normal businessman.
This policy requires little stretching to explain the doctrine of
ratification. Once the principal confirms the purported agency relation-
ship to the business world, it should be considered final. Since the
agency relationship is such a regular feature of normal business activity,
the businessman should have a right to expect that it will not be re-
called once confirmed. As agency law recognizes apparent authority
to be an independent ground for binding a principal, so can it recognize
an independent doctrine of ratification.
34. Id. § 8, comment d.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37.. See Mearns, Vicariot" Liability for Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REV. 50, 53(1962).
19681
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
THE RULES ANALYZED
If the above-proposed thesis has merit, it should facilitate the
explanation not only of the basic theory of ratification but also of its
rules of operation, which have been followed more from a sense of
tradition than from understanding. Although an exhaustive study of
minutiae will not be undertaken here, it is hoped that the more trouble-
some rules will be seen as indeed furthering the objectives of the rati-
fication doctrine.
A. Purporting to Act as Agent
It is well settled today that a consensual transaction with a third
person can be ratified only if the agent purported to act for another.3
8
The rationale offered for this rule is that when there is a transaction
between the purported agent and a third person, ratification grants to
the third party what he expected to get through his dealings with the
agent. Thus, if T did not intend to deal with the principal there is no
reason for the doctrine of ratification. 9
What of the case, however, where the agent admits to the third
party that he does not have the authority to act for his principal? Is
it a requisite for effective ratification that the agent, in addition to
purporting to be an agent, must also purport to have adequate au-
thority for the transaction? Strangely enough, it is the position of
both the First " and Second Restatements of Agency 4 ' that a prin-
cipal may ratify an agreement made by an agent who admitted to the
third party that he was without authority to act for his principal.
The Restatement itself offers little in the way of reasoning for
this somewhat strange proposition. In 1952, however, the case of
Hirzel Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co.' produced a
professor's classroom hypothetical upon which the late Professor Seavey
felt bound to comment. A young man died and his divorced mother
sought to arrange a funeral service for him with a local mortician. The
mother admitted to the mortician that she was not authorized to arrange
the funeral service at the father's expense, but would attempt to prevail
on him to bear the cost of the funeral. After the funeral, the father
agreed to pay for the burial out of the proceeds of the boy's life insur-
ance policy of which he was the beneficiary. He later reneged on the
38. RESTATEMENT § 85 and cases cited in Reporter's Notes thereto.
39. RESTATEMENT § 85 (1), comment a.
40. RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) oF AGENCY § 85(1), comment c (1933).
41. RESTATEMENT § 85(1), comment e.
42. 46 Del. 334, 83 A.2d 700 (Super. Ct. 1951).
43. Seavey, Ratification-Purporting to Act ar Agent, 21 U. CHt. L. REv., 248
(1954).
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agreement. The court held that the father's promise created no
obligation to the mortician.
The person who acts as agent must purport to be the agent
of the principal, and the contract must be made upon the faith
and credit of the principal. Ratification means adoption of
that which was done for and in the name of another; hence,
the contract, at its inception, must purport to be the contract
of the principal. It is not sufficient to constitute ratification
that the contract may have enured to the benefit of a person
sought to be charged as principal.44
The Seavey Critique
The Hirzel Funeral Homes case is especially valuable since it
focuses directly on the issue of ratification. The father could not be
held on traditional contract theory since he had agreed to pay the cost
of the funeral only after the funeral had been performed. There was,
therefore, no present consideration to support his promise to pay.
Seavey argues that there is no reason to require that the third
person believe the agent to be authorized.45 He contends that recovery
based on ratification is beneficent and is designed to hurdle the tech-
nicalities of tort and contract so as to carry out the intent of the
parties involved. If so, what harm is incurred in allowing the mortician
to recover what he expected to receive? Furthermore, Seavey points
out that according to the reasoning of the court the mortician
would have been better off if the mother had lied to him and said that
she was the authorized agent of her husband who had asked her to
arrange for the funeral. Then there would have been the necessary
purporting to act under the authority of another and the ratification
would have been valid. As it was, there was no warranty of authority
by the wife, and the mortician had no claim against the estate of the
son since he did not intend to charge the estate and was not acting in
the public interest; the mortician therefore paid for his folly by perform-
ing unrewarded labor.
Seavey charges that the court in Hirzel reached a result which
was both unjust and unsupported by the authorities. He concludes:
The typical situation comparable to that in the case under
discussion is that where a traveling representative having only
power to make offers, as the other party knows, makes a
tentative agreement, subject to approval by the principal.
44. 46 Del. at 337, 83 A.2d at 702 (quoting from Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App.
539, 544, 36 N.E. 173, 175 (1894)).
45. Seavey, supra note 43, at 250.
19681
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In this situation the courts properly ignore the fact that the
transaction does not purport to be a contract.46
Purporting in Perspective
It is this writer's opinion that Hirzel Funeral Homes reached a
correct result and that Professor Seavey's analysis is mistaken in that
it fails to account for the crucial value of agency involved in the doc-
trine of ratification.
In Hirzel, when the mother attempted to arrange for the funeral
of her son, she informed the mortician of her lack of authority to bind
the father to pay the funeral expenses. There was no attempt to induce
the mortician to rely on an agency relationship. Nor was there any
affirmation to the parties involved or to the business community at
large '7 that the mother was the agent of the father to arrange for the
funeral. If the mortician decided with full knowledge of the facts to
take a calculated business risk that he might not be paid, he cannot
complain when the father, after agreeing to pay, reverses his position.
Unless we are to frontally assault the contract doctrine that past con-
sideration will not support a contract, there is no quid pro quo with
which to hold the father to his promise.
Seavey expresses displeasure with the notion that the result in
Hirzel would differ if the mother had lied and represented to the
mortician that she was authorized to act for her husband. But it is
submitted that it is entirely just for a different result to follow. If the
mother had represented herself as an authorized agent and the father
had then ratified, the transaction would have taken on the color of a
normally completed business deal in which an agent had acted for a
principal. As noted earlier, to disrupt the agency relationship once it
has been confirmed is to foist a cruel hoax on the business community
which of necessity must conduct the majority of its transactions
through agents.
Under the above analysis, a principal is held if he ratifies an
"agency" even though he receives no consideration; he is not bound if
46. Id.
47. Although cases on point are few, it seems to be the generally accepted rule
that ratification will be effective if clearly made to any person and need not necessarily
be made to the agent or third party involved in the transaction. See MECHEM § 216;
RESTATEMENT § 95. This is generally in line with the proposed analysis since any
statement to the business community that one who purported to be an agent was in
fact authorized should bring the question of the existence of the agency relationship to
a close. This author regards as sheer folly the assertions by some courts and com-
mentators that ratification is "merely an act of the mind" and that communication is
only necessary for evidentiary purposes. See, e.g., Miller v. Chatsworth Say. Bank.
203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722 (1927); Bayley v. Bryant, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 198
(1839) ; RESTATEMENT § 95, comment a.
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he adopts a "contract" without consideration. This result is quite
justifiable. If the person with whom the third party deals makes it
clear that there is no agency relationship,4" then the third party should
suspect a subsequent promise from the "principal." He should know
that the "principal" is making a promise without consideration, which
is to say the least unusual in the world of commerce and invalid under
the law of contract. One has the impression that too much attention
has been directed to the underlying "contract" or "tort" which the
principal is ratifying.49 It would be far more helpful to focus on the
agency relationship; it is that relationship which may be ratified."
48. If there is an agency, and the agent merely cautions the third party that he
may be acting outside the scope of his authority, the principal may be bound when he
ratifies. Although the third party took a calculated risk in dealing with the agent, the
principal should be bound if the risk was reasonably induced by the existence of the
agency relationship. He should not be bound, however, if the transaction was so far
outside the scope of the agency that it bore no reasonable relation to it. This is con-
sistent with the theory that the basis of the ratification doctrine is the fulfillment of
the expectations of the business community in relying on the agency relationship.
Cf. text accompanying notes 53-54 infra, where the third party and the agent agree
that the formation of a contract is conditioned on the principal's acceptance.
49. If one views the ratification doctrine as a preserver of the integrity of the
agency relationship once it has been confirmed by a purported principal, it becomes
possible to construct a theoretical justification for ratification of a tort. The problem
of tort ratification has been viewed with some concern by the most noted authors in
the agency field. See MECHEM §§ 212-14; SEAVEy § 33E. The usual situation in which
the master benefits from the act of the servant which results in a tort does not present
serious theoretical difficulties. It is at least possible to rationalize liability to the
principal on the ground that respondeat superior is designed to place the cost of doing
business at the door of the entrepreneur chiefly benefiting from the activity which led
to the tort. If the master has decided to accept the servant's activities as within the
scope of his business even after the tort has been committed, then it is not unjust that
he bear the burdens of the damage which the agent has wrought. See Dempsey v.
Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891).
It is the case of negligence by an unauthorized person, usually a servant not acting
within the scope of employment, that provides the most serious theoretical problem.
Why should the law impose liability on a master for having approved the tortious act
of a servant acting outside the scope of his employment or of a person who was not
even a servant at the time the tortious act was committed? If we assume that subse-
quent to the tortious act A purported to have acted for P and P confirms that a
master-servant relationship did in fact exist at the time of the tortious act, it does not
appear unjust to bind P to his statement confirming the agency. Although the policy
reasons for ratification are not as strong as in the contract area, they are not without
validity. The master-servant relationship occurs with such frequency and its conse-
quences are so far-reaching that once representations of its existence are confirmed T
should be able to rely on the finality of such a statement. It should be noted that
again this author finds himself in substantial opposition to the Restatement of Agency
position which permits ratification of a tort if "the one doing the act intends or purports
to perform it as the servant of another." RESTATEMENT §85(2) (emphasis added).
Unless the master benefits from the activity of the servant, the mere intention of the
servant to act for the master without purporting to T that such was his intent should
not suffice for the imposition of liability.
50. Cf. Keighly, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, [1901] A.C. 240; M. FERSON, PRIN-
CIPLES OF AGENCY § 234 (1954) ; MECHEM § 204. If this view is taken of the ratifica-
tion doctrine, there is no difficulty at all in explaining why an undisclosed principal
may not ratify a contract. When an agent secretly intends to act for an undisclosed
principal who gave him no authority to contract, there is no representation to anyone
in the business community that he intended to act as agent. To permit the principal to
ratify would serve no purpose whatsoever.
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Ratification Mislabeled
Contrary to Seavey's assertion the cases do not support his position
that there may be ratification where the agent admits to the third party
that he is not authorized to contract for the principal. Wilkins v.
Waldo Lumber Co.5 is cited as typifying the case in which courts are
willing to find ratification without the agent purporting to be au-
thorized. In Wilkins a traveling representative having power only to
make contracts subject to approval by his principal offered to purchase
an entire lot of sawed wood lumber from the plaintiff. A contract with
the plaintiff was signed by the agent subject to confirmation by the
principal. Although the defendant-principal never formally confirmed
the contract, several days after it was executed a company began re-
moving the lumber from the plaintiff's lot at the principal's direction.
Subsequently the defendant sought to alter the terms of the contract
as agreed upon between the agent and the plaintiff. The court held
that the defendant had ratified the contract by removing and hauling
the lumber from the plaintiff's lot. That the agent's lack of authority
to contract was known to the plaintiff is claimed to be proof that an
agent's act may be ratified even if the third party knows of the agent's
lack of authority.
It must be conceded that the court in Wilkins does find for the
plaintiff on the basis of ratification, as do other courts in very similar
fact situations.52 But it is indeed difficult to understand why courts
in these situations strain for the rather esoteric doctrine of ratification
when simple contract law could resolve the cases with ease. When a
third party contracts with an agent whose sole function is to make
offers subject to confirmation by a principal and the -principal subse-
quently manifests to the third party by either word or deed that he
agrees to the contract, there is offer and acceptance in the traditional
sense.' It is ludicrous to talk in terms of ratification of an agency in
51. 130 Me. 5, 153 A. 191 (1931).
52. Cases frequently cited as supporting the proposition that ratification is ap-
plicable even when the agent admits his lack of authority are Slater v. Berlin, 94 A.2d
38 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); Public Say. Ins. Co. of America-v. Greenwald, 68
Ind. App. 609, 121 N.E. 47 (1918). See also Gran v. Board of Educ., 274 Minn. 220,
143 N.W.2d 246 (1966); McCrillis v. A & W Enterprises, Inc., 270 N.C. 637, 155
S.E.2d 281 (1967). Under closer scrutiny these cases are easily explained on strict
contract theory without resort to tortured analysis based on ratification. The analysis
would be similar to that in Wilkins.
53. Cole-Mclntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141 Tenn. 679, 214 S.W. 817 (1919),
often cited together with Wilkins for the "purporting" rule, is really a prototype of
contract cases in which acceptance of a contract is accomplished by silence due to ex-
tenuating circumstances. The facts indicate that in March 1917, a Cole-McIntyre
traveling salesman solicited and received a written order from Holloway for 50 barrels
of meal. The order expressly stated that the salesman had no power to make a con-
tract and that the order would not be binding until accepted by the seller at its own
office. From the court's statement it may be presumed that this order was received
by the seller, but it said and did nothing in consequence thereof until two months later
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these cases when all parties were apprised of the fact that the agent;
was not contracting in his capacity as agent but was merely transmitting
the offer to the principal for confirmation. The contract is valid as
between the principal and the third party because they have objectively
manifested to one another their consent to contract. Of course, under
a simple contract analysis, the contract is formed when the principal
manifests his consent to the third party. However, in the case of the
traveling agent who contracts subject to confirmation by his principal,
the contract is often considered to be in force from the date of the
original agreement with the agent. This would appear to be more
consistent with the ratification doctrine and the "relation back" concept
than with contract analysis. There is no real difficulty here, however,
for the principal and the third party may include in their present agree-
ment a term that the contract be considered made as of the time and
place of the agreement with the agent.5 4
B. Withdrawal Before Ratification
One of the most troubling problems with the ratification doctrine
is the rule that if T learns of the agent's lack of authorization prior to
P's ratification, T may withdraw, thus denying P the right to ratify.55
The rationale supporting this rule has been that it would be unfair to
hold T to an offer for which no consideration has been given."6 On the
other hand, it has been clearly recognized that ratification is not based
in any way on traditional offer and acceptance analysis.5" The result-
ing inconsistency in the application of contract principles may be
avoided, however, if the rule of ratification is explained by the principle
that a business transaction completed through an agent and confirmed
should not later be called into question. There is then no difficulty in
explaining the "withdrawal" rule. It is only after confirmation of the
agency that the business world takes offense when a principal seeks to
revoke the agency. Prior to ratification nothing is lost if T wishes to
withdraw since no confirmation has been made to the business com-
when the buyer asked for the meal to be shipped. At that time, the seller notified
the buyer that the order was rejected. In the meantime, war had been declared and
prices had risen. The court held that the seller's delay in informing the buyer was
unreasonable and that it operated as an acceptance of the order. For a discussion of
this case see Comment, When Silence Gives Consent, 29 YALE L.J. 441 (1920). It is
indeed difficult to see how this case even relates to the problem of ratification. But
see RESTATEMENT, Reporter's Notes to § 85.
54. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 890 (1920). If the
parties do not include such a term, the court may nonetheless conclude that the earlier
date is more consistent with ordinary business practice and is therefore the implied
intent of the parties.
55. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
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munity that a transaction which was stamped with regularity was in
fact regular. Once P affirms the agency, both T and P must be bound;
to permit T to withdraw subsequent to ratification would permit him
to avoid a contract which at the moment of ratification appeared to
the business community to be a normally completed transaction.
To discover a single principle which explains the operation of the
doctrine of ratification in all cases, it is necessary to reflect on the
function of the agent within the world of commerce. Agency is an
indispensable tool for the completion of the vast majority of business
transactions. When one purports to be an authorized agent and his
agency is confirmed by the purported principal, there should be no
further attack on the bona fides of the relationship. The entire trans-
action undertaken by the agent has now been stamped with regularity.
It ought not be recalled at the whim of either party.
